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ARTICLES 
Bitter Knowledge: Socrates and 
Teaching By Disillusionment 
by Thomas D. Eisele· 
* ProfessQr of Law, University of Cincinnati. University of Michigan (Ph.D., 
Philosophy, 1984); Harvard University (J.D., 1973). 
This essay examines Socratic teaching by investigating one aspect of my own practice in 
law school today; its companion essay, "The Poverty of Socratic Questioning: Asking and 
Answering in the Meno," examines Socratic teaching by investigating Socrates' practice in 
the Meno. They are meant to complement, and to complicate, one another. They also are 
meant to exte~d and to supplement some of the views of Socratic teaching expressed in two 
earlier essays'ofmine: Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495 (1987); and "Neuer 
Mind the Manner of My Speech," 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 253 (1990). 
This essay is a revision of a lecture presented at Clemson University's "Conference on 
Professional ~thics & Social Responsibility," November 21-23, 1991. I thank Professor 
Daniel Wueste for the invitation to address the conferees, and Professors Jack Sammons 
and Hamner Hill for helpful comments on the initial version of my lecture. Since then, I 
have had the generous benefit of critical comments from Professor James Boyd White and 
Professor Tho'mas Shaffer. They both are remarkable readers and friends. 
It gives me pleasure to dedicate this work to Stanley Cavell, a native of Atlanta, Georgia, 
in whose life and work the spirit of Socratic philosophical inquiry lives on. 
587 
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"Disillusion is what fits us for reality, whether in Plato's terms or D. 
W. Winnicott's. But then we must be assured that this promise is 
based on a true knowledge of what our illusions are." 
-Stanley Cavell} 
We who teach by questioning our students, and then criticizing their 
answers, teach in emulation of Socrates. Law teachers use a version of 
the Socratic method (or, perhaps better, several variants of it) as do 
philosophy professors, English teachers, classics professors, and the like. 
How does this method work? What kind of teaching is this? 
I have taught law since 1984 and have engaged in some form of 
university teaching since 1978, and yet it occurred to me only recently 
that much of what we teach in law (and in the humanities) is bitter 
knowledge, knowledge gained by a process of disillusionment. When I 
came to see this, it struck me as odd that I had repressed for so long this 
knowledge of what I was doing in class to my students. Then it struck 
me as odder still that we law teachers (and teachers in the humanities 
in general) teach by disillusionment. What kind of way is this to bring 
along students? What good is it? 
I pose the question this way because I want "good" to have both its 
functional and its ethical force here. I mean to ask, that is, not only 
what the efficacy or the usefulness of this teaching technique is, but also 
what the propriety of it is. What does Socratic teaching teach our 
students to do, and how does it teach them this? And what does such a 
teaching method do to our students in the process of teaching them 
whatever it teaches them? I shall say right now, at the beginning, that 
my understanding of legal education (as I have tried to explain in 
greater detail elsewhere)2 is that we teach our students ethics through 
the ethics of our teaching. In the present context, this means that 
teaching by disillusionment is an ethical tool that we law teachers use, 
as well as an ethical choice that we make. Accordingly, teaching by 
means of disillusionment is a part of the ethics of legal education. 
Additionally, if such teaching is a part of the ethos or character of legal 
education (as I think it is), then I would claim that it also is-and must 
be-a part of the ethos or character of legal practice and the legal 
profession. 
1. STANLEY CAVELL, The Politics of Interpretation (Politics as Opposed to What?), in 
THEMES OUT OF SCHOOL: EFFECTS AND CAUSES 27, 54 (1984). 
2. See Thomas D. Eisele, Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495 (1987) (in 
which I discuss, among other things, Socrates' teaching in the Protagoras). 
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I am not going to attempt to defend these claims in any general way, 
nor am I going to try to answer the budget of questions I have posed. 
Rather, in this essay I hope to suggest the reality and substance of these 
questions by pausing to examine in detail one aspect of how I teach in 
law school. I claim to be using the "Socratic method" when I question 
and critici:.z;e my students and when I entertain their own questions and 
criticisms of me. It is this interplay of questioning and answering, I 
believe, upon which much of present-day law school teaching is built. In 
so far as the Socratic method so conceived is an important basis of law 
school tea¢hing today, I also believe that such teaching is inevitably and 
intentionally founded upon the aim of teaching by disillusionment. I 
now would like to see what kind of practice this is, and what meaning 
can be claimed for it.3 
I. How I TEACH IN LAw SCHOOL 
I use different teaching styles in large and small classes. (By "large," 
I mean classes of forty or more students. Seminars or classes numbering 
less than twenty students are "small." The rest are intermediate.) Since 
many dynamics of teaching change as class size changes, for purposes of 
this essay I am limiting my remarks to large classes. When I am 
teaching a class in Property, Estates & Trusts, Land Use Law, or Legal 
Ethics, typically I prepare for class by doing several things. First, I read 
intensively the cases, statutes, problems, and other materials assigned 
for class, thinking about what makes them tick, how they work, and 
what I wish to point out about them. I also focus upon ambiguities or 
potential problems in the materials, things that I question or that I 
expect the students to question or to be bothered or confused by. Third, 
I think about how we as a class can manage to cover all of these 
items-how I can say what I want to say and also hear and respond to 
what the students want to say-in the fifty or seventy-five minutes 
allotted. Finally, I think about how I should try to structure my 
thoughts ~nd questions on the materials, and the thoughts and questions 
that are apt to be expressed by the students, and how to present and 
coordinate the points I want to bring out and the points that they are 
apt to make, in a coherent scheme, in a way that makes them compre-
hensible for the students in the class. Otherwise, while the particular 
point or question that anyone might raise with respect to these materials 
3. It is a further question to ask, "In what ways or to what extent is what we today call 
'Socratic method' related to the activity we see defined and performed by Socrates in the 
dialogues left us by Plato?" I pursue this further question in my companion essay: The 
Poverty of Sqcratic Questioning: Asking and Answering in the Meno, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. _ 
(1994). 
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may make sense in isolation, I cannot be confident that it will make 
sense in sequence, as it comes up during the class. Thus, this is another 
part of what I try to anticipate in organizing these matters. (I am 
organizing them for my benefit intellectually, so that I understand them, 
and pedagogically, so that I can teach them, and for the benefit of the 
students.) It is a challenging project. 
In thinking about all of this, I find myself thinking not only about 
what needs to be said and done, but also about how any of this can be 
I:!-chieved. Of course I realize that some of these matters will in a sense 
take care of themselves, because any class, as it unfolds or works itself 
out, will inevitably achieve insights and provoke problems that "just 
happen." They are not wholly planned and perhaps not even much 
under my control, nor are they things that I can always anticipate. The 
insights and problems that we in the class discover from our discussion 
and its give-and-take are in this respect incalculable, and probably are 
better for that. But this incalculability is itself a condition of teaching, 
something that needs to be considered (even if not calculated). To my 
mind, the only way to honor this condition of teaching is for a teacher to 
place his or her faith in the unknowable workings of the classroom, to 
recognize the limits of what one can do as a teacher, and to welcome the 
gifts that education brings. The ensuing mystery is one not only of 
teaching and learning and how they happen, but also of the process of 
inquiry itself: how it proceeds from doubt or· question or concern, 
turning itself into interrogation and investigation, perhaps tentative and 
often intuitive, and finally reaching insight or revelation (but then also, 
sometimes, defeat). Much of what goes on in a class-be it good, bad, or 
mediocre-is serendipitous. Although one may sometimes be able to 
anticipate that something will happen (given the materials at hand, for 
example, or the people involved in the class), often one still cannot 
predict what will happen. 
But a teacher cannot just place his or her faith in classroom dynamics; 
a teacher cannot just wait for the intellectual sparks to fly. "Spontane-
ous combustion" is a rare occurrence in any context, and doubly so in the 
classro,om; besides, it still requires the right conditions. Thus, a teacher 
must think about how all of what he or she wants to happen in the class 
might take place, how conditions favorable to its appearance might be 
created.4 In law school, we create favorable conditions, we investigate 
4. Some law teachers-perhaps many of them-may find my description inaccurate for 
their own preparatory process. In particular, I suspect that some may say that they go into 
class with a much less rigid or explicit scheme of presentation in mind, and that they are 
happy jUi)t to provoke discussion, which then may take many unexpected yet productive 
turns. 
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our assigned materials, and we provoke discussion, by asking questions 
of our students. This practice is akin to what Socrates did, asking 
questions ofp-is interlocutors who asked questions of him. His example 
of education by interrogation, by criticism and argument, has come to 
seem a paradigm for Western education. So it is that, in thinking about 
how all of what I want or hope my class to be will happen, I tend to 
think about how my lesson-plan can be accomplished by means of asking 
questions of my students. 
Asking questions of our students is a technique in law teaching that 
proceeds not only on the basis of our claim to be using the Socratic 
method, but also upon the belief that our students have carefully read 
these materials and thought about them prior to class. This last point 
is important in a couple of respects. First, it illustrates that the law 
school teaching context is one in which we claim that all of us are able 
to participate (as is mostly the case in the Platonic dialogues as well) 
and that we all are engaged in the materials at hand. These may be 
fictions of course, but they are convenient, living, operative fictions upon 
which we take action and teach as though they were the case. The 
assumption of mutual preparation also illustrates that the questions 
asked-either those of the teacher or those of the students-make sense 
only within a given context. Such preparation helps to ensure that the 
teacher and s,tudents share a context in which the questions asked will 
make sense to all of them. The process of preparing ourselves for class 
makes us more commensurate and, hence, more communicative, more 
capable of sharing the process of education. 
The preparatory process that I have described typIcally takes place 
over a series of days, even weeks, but most intensively for me the night 
before a class and again in the hour(s) immediately preceding a class. 
I have come to think of this as a process of priming myself to perform, 
to go on stage before my students, and to enact an intellectual drama of 
I do not deny that this can be done successfully by a teacher using a Socratic method; 
but I wish to add two thoughts. First, I have learned not to expect to be able to answer 
every question asked during a class, and I have become relatively resigned to this truth. 
Still, I find that the process of preparation and organization I have just described helps me 
to understand student questions better, to make better sense of them, than I otherwise 
seem able to do (when, for example, I go to class less prepared or organized than I like to 
be). So, for me, the structure helps (and I think it helps the students too, although of 
course I cannot b~ sure and I have no way of testing this intuition). Second, while I do not 
want to dampen the possibility for innovation or improvisation in what we discover in my 
law classes, I believe that even innovation and improvisation proceed on the basis of a 
script; or, they take off from a script or a score. In other words, a structure can itself be 
a necessary condition for making innovation or improvisation possible. See DAVID SUDNOW, 
WAYS OF THE HAND: THE ORGANIZATION OF IMPROVISED CONDUCT (1978). 
HeinOnline -- 45 Mercer L. Rev. 592 1993-1994
592 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
enthusiastic yet daunting engagement with the materials.5 But the 
enactment is not solely my own, nor is the engagement mine alone. I 
may be a major player in the class, but I am not the only one on stage, 
and the students are not there simply as my audience. I am not there 
to perform a soliloquy; I am there to help the students learn and 
understand these materials, these texts, concerns, problems, values, and 
knots of nested human complexity and need that we find and wrestle 
with in our law and legal system. I can do this best-I can help the 
students learn and understand these materials-not by lecturing to 
them, but rather by investigating these materials in tandem with them 
as we jointly question and analyze, role-play, or otherwise work through 
the materials together (assuming that the students already have done 
some of this same work on their own prior to class). 
At the end of this preparatory process, I come into class, set my books 
and notes around me, and at the appropriate time bring the class to 
order and attention. I am the person directing the show. I may begin 
with a question, and it may range from a broad question ("What is the 
importance of possession to property claims?" or "Why do we put so 
much weight on the fact of possession in Property law?") to a specific 
question ("What is the holding in Pierson v. Post?"6 or "Who won in 
Pierson v. Post and why did he win?"). Or I may simply ask, "Who has 
Pierson v. Post ready?," which is my lingo for asking who among my 
students is prepared to state that particular case to the class. 
More often than not, however, I do not begin with a question of any 
kind. Rather, I start by lecturing, sketching the background of the 
lesson for the day, perhaps reviewing briefly what was said and done the 
class before this one, perhaps simply starting a new topic or continuing 
an old one by saying something more about it. What is important to me 
is that I give the students a sense of the universe of understanding and 
discourse into which our specific topic for the day fits. If we are 
beginning a new topic, then I want the students to see the whole of 
which the new topic is a part; if instead our class consists of continuing 
our study of an already broached topic, then I want the students to see 
where we have been and where we are going. I think they need this 
5. It is old news to say that teaching is in part a performance or a kind of theater. 
Here, with regard to legal education, I only wish to note that it should not be surprising 
to find a significant theatrical element in the teaching of a profession, when that profession 
itself has important theatrical dimensions. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: 
An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REv. 81 
(1975). 
6. 3 Caines 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). This is the famous fox case, with which many 
Property teachers still begin their classes. 
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kind of holism or continuity, this frame-setting, if each separate and 
discrete cl~ss session is to make the most sense for them in sequence, 
and I try to provide a frame for them. This is not to say that I sketch 
anew the entire universe every time that we begin a new topic. I simply 
try to say enough to remind them of sketches that we have made in prior 
classes, or perhaps enough to give them the lay of the land in this 
particular province of law and language. I think students learn better 
if the class :begins by my setting the context for the day's work. (I know 
that I learn better if I understand the context of the materials to be 
discussed and the questions to be raised that day.) In addition, 
whatever thoughts, developments, and refinements that I have been able 
to work out for myself-if I think the students are ready for them-I 
want to share with my students so that we have some common ground 
on which to approach the day's materials. Consequently, I try to give 
them som~ sense of why we are examining the materials we are 
discussing that day, of where and even how these materials fit into the 
"big pictur¢" that I have (of Property or Estates & Trusts or Land Use), 
of how I approach the materials we have at hand. This context-setting 
is not mine to do alone: it proceeds hand-in-hand with introductory and 
contextual ,materials set out in the casebook or the photocopy materials 
that we are using for the class. I depend upon the book to have done 
much of this work, and thus depend upon the students to have absorbed 
enough of this information such that occasional reminders from me, 
often in the form of analogies, images, metaphors, and outlines, are 
sufficient to create a world in which the specific cases, problems, and 
questions for the class make sense. 
Having set the context, introduced the topic, or described a bridge that 
gets us from yesterday's class to the present, I begin asking questions: 
Who can state the case? What was its holding? What did the court give 
as the relevant facts? Did the court miss the relevance or implication of 
any of the facts that it stated in its opinion? Did it over-emphasize or 
under-emphasize some fact, value, or policy? What was the rule of law 
that the court gave as its ratio decidendi? Was the rule well-stated? 
Well-applied? Well-understood by the court? Does the student stating 
the case (o:r any other student in class) think that the court's arguments 
or reasons for its analysis and judgment were well-stated or well-
founded? Why or why not? What was the crucial aspect of the case (in 
the court's view, based upon its explanation of why and how it acted; 
and from the student's point of view)? What were the equities between 
the parties? Can we, in this class, design a better decision, make better 
use out of the materials of law at hand? What can we include in the law 
that the court excludes, or what can we remove from the law that the 
court finds itself unable to jettison? And what does such inclusion or 
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exclusion do to the body of law that we are studying? Does it improve 
it; or does it impoverish it? 
All of these are good questions if asked on the right occasion, and 
occasionally I ask them. But more often than not, I do not even reach 
them, or proceed very far with them, because the student volunteering 
to discuss the case has said something wrong. Usually, when one of my 
students begins to state the case (by describing what happened in the 
world to initiate this case, or by describing how the courts disposed of 
this case in one way or another), I find some misstatement of fact or law, 
or some omission of fact or procedure, that I think is significant. As a 
result, I stop the student: "Bob, you said that Post was chasing the fox, 
but you didn't say where this chase took place, or how, or in what 
manner, Post undertook this chase. Do you remember where the chase 
took place? How it was done?" Or: "Susan, you say that the majority 
holds that you don't have to actually possess the fox, but can merely 
chase and seriously wound it, in order to gain title to it. Is that really 
what this case holds? Why or why not?" To such questions, I usually 
get one of two responses. 
First, the student may remember, or think that they remember, what 
I am referring to or getting at in my interjection, and then he or she 
tries to respond, telling me and the rest of the class what they think I 
have asked for. Sometimes the student is right, sometimes wrong. If, 
in what they offer the class in response, the fact or procedure or rule 
that I am looking for is stated, then myfollow-up question often is, "Why 
do you think I asked that question? What is important or significant 
about this fact (or procedure or rule)?" This tends to get the student 
thinking about what he or she missed in the case, what they failed to see 
or to think about when they prepared the case for class. Oftentimes, the 
person best-placed to answer my follow-up question is not the student 
who originally recited the case, but another student in the class who has 
been listening to our exchange, taking it in, and who suddenly sees what 
now needs to be said. Usually, that student then raises his or her hand 
and, being recognized, tells us the importance or significance of the 
omitted fact, procedure, or rule. 
On the other hand, if the fact, procedure, or rule that I am looking for 
is not stated in what the original student offers me in response to my 
initial question, then my follow-up question is apt to be, "Can anyone 
else see what I'm looking for here? Can anyone else help us?" The room 
is then open for another volunteer. One sometimes comes forward, but 
at other times the entire roomful of students seems to be baftled by my 
question. 
In response to my original interjection; however, I may get a quite 
different response. It is not really an answer, but rather is a rejection 
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of my query: I may get back a blank stare, or a quizzical look, or even 
a glare. Then the student either does not know what I am looking 
for-and knows that he or she does not know this-or else does not care 
what I am looking for. In this situation, the student usually refuses to 
proceed further-he or she may even refuse to acknowledge my follow-up 
question-ahd simply withdraws within himself or herself and refrains 
from participating further. Then I begin again, seeking another student 
who can tell me what I want to know. 
II. AsKING QUESTIONS, EXPECTING ANSWERS 
This is all that I wish to describe of my teaching in law school, 
although of course it consists of more than merely this, especially as we 
get toward the end of our class session. At that time, I often move into 
a different mode and try to bring fragments of the day's class together, 
perhaps comparing and contrasting things said throughout the class, or 
else reminding the students of something we had said the day or week 
or month before and now try to show them its relevance to what we have 
just this day discussed; and so on. But all that I want for the moment 
is the slice of teaching just described, where I am questioning (and to 
some extent antagonizing) my students, and they are responding (or 
failing to respond, or choosing not to respond). This is the part of my 
teaching, of legal education, that I wish to call "teaching by disillusion-
ment." How does it work and what might it mean? 
Let me begin from the perspective of how I understand my own actions 
in this context. Begin with my questions, different ones of which are 
asked at different times for different reasons. Many times, when I ask 
my questions, I am looking for specific answers or responses.7 On the 
holding of a case, for example, I often have a particular way in which I 
think the holding should be correctly stated. While I recognize that 
there is a certain amount of leeway in stating the holding of a case, I do 
not permit just any statement to stand, either as offered by my students 
or as suggested to me by the teacher's manual drafted by the editors of 
the casebook I am using at the time. And if I receive, in response to one 
7. Here is one point at which I would like to discuss some of the very interesting 
thoughts on law school teaching expressed by Paul Hayden in his article on right and 
wrong answers. See Paul Hayden, On "Wrong" Answers in the Law School Classroom, 40 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 251 (1990). I take his basic point to be that even purportedly "wrong" 
answers can be educationally useful. I grant him this. But I would want to continue the 
dialogue by saying that a part of one's education is the lesson that not just anything can 
be said or claimed in answer to specific questions in specific areas of the law. While a 
wrong answer 'may teach us any number of useful lessons, it still remains to be learned 
how and why the answer is demonstrably wrong. 
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of my questions, a holding that by my lights is incorrectly stated, then 
I try again to elicit it, either from the same student or from another. 
Eventually, I may offer my own statement of the holding; and, if I do, 
then I normally go on to parse it, explaining to my students why I have 
included what I did in the statement of the holding, and why I omitted 
what they may think is an important aspect or element of the case's 
holding. 
At other times, however, I am not looking for any particular answer 
to the question I have asked, and in fact I am asking it because I do not 
know the answer but think that the question is somehow "a good one" 
(perhaps because it tends to provoke thought, or at least argument; or 
perhaps because the kinds of answers that it tends to evoke have proven 
to be useful responses with which to conjure). And oftentimes, in a 
situation where I ask a question to which I do not know the answer, I 
ask my question because I really want to learn what my students are 
thinking about these materials, what they are making out of them (and, 
indirectly, out of the course as a whole), as well as how my students are 
developing as lawyers. 
In thinking about these two different situations in which I ask 
questions-where I know the answer or at least where I expect a certain 
answer to be given, and where I do not know the answer or at least do 
not expect any particular answer to be given-I think about them as two 
fundamentally different scenes of instruction.s In one kind of scene of 
instruction, I am engaging in what I think of as an "exercise," in which 
we are essentially rehearsing answers that I have heard before, answers 
that I want and expect to come in front of the class, answers that do not 
surprise me at all (if, as usually happens, the answer given is the one 
that I have anticipated will be given). At other times, however, I am 
seeking to glean information from my students by asking them questions 
8. One way of stating the difference between these two scenes of instruction is to focus 
upon a useful bivalence or ambiguity in the sentence, "I am looking for an answer." In the 
first scene (~here I think I know the answer), I am "looking for" an answer in the sense 
that I am expecting it; I look to my students to provide it to me in response to my question. 
In the second scene (where I do not know the answer), I am "looking for" an answer in the 
sense that I am searching for one; I am looking for it along with my students. 
I have been helped to think in terms of "scenes of instruction" by the attention that 
Stanley Cavell has paid this aspect of teaching and learning in the later writings of 
Wittgenstein. Here I refer the reader to Cavell's discussion of the opening section of 
Wittgenstein's Phil080phicallnllestigations, which Cavell characterizes as both a "scene of 
inheritance" and a "scene of instruction" (among other things): STANLEY CAVELL, THIs NEW 
YET UNAPPROACHABLE AMERICA: LECTURES AFTER EMERSON AFTER WITTGENSTEIN 60-61, 
64-65 (1989). See also STANLEY CAVELL, CONDITIONS HANDSOME AND UNHANDSOME: THE 
CONSTITUTlON OF EMERSONIAN PERFECTIONISM 64-100 (1990) (the second chapter, entitled 
The Argument of the Ordinary: Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke). 
HeinOnline -- 45 Mercer L. Rev. 597 1993-1994
1994] BI1TER KNOWLEDGE 597 
to which I do not know the answers, in which case I think about the 
scene ofinstrtlction as being a matter of "true inquiry" or "investigation." 
Please notice however: these are names or characterizations of what we 
are doing in the classroom from my perspective alone; this is not the way 
in which I want my students to view the matter. 
If students in my class were to see or to think that we were merely 
"rehearsing" answers during a part of our class, I think they would be 
contemptuous of the process. "If you, Eisele, know these answers, then 
why don't you simply tell them to us?!," they might ask. In addition to 
the implied request that I stop fooling around as their teacher, they 
might also IO,se interest in the process. For what is the point of going 
through an inquiry or an investigation if it is not really an investigation 
(but instead is what I called it above, an exercise)? It seems to be a 
charade, and it is not only inefficient to teach in this way, but also 
duplicitous or even disrespectful. The students are apt to feel as though 
I were fooling them, playing some sort of trick on them; and if this is 
what I am doing, they want no part of it. 
It is at this point, I believe, where we must think about what we are 
doing as law ,teachers and why we do it. As a teacher, I do not want to 
take the experience ofleaming by self-discovery away from my students, 
which might occur if I act or signal that, for me, this is all rote, all a 
mere "exercise," a matter simply of putting students through their paces. 
While I may already know the answers to some of the questions I am 
asking, this does not mean that the students already know them. 
Simply becau.se I am not surprised by certain answers to certain 
questions, does not mean that the answers themselves are unsurprising, 
or that the students are not surprised by these same answers. Good 
teaching in this regard disguises the fact that a teacher may already 
know the answer to a question, or at least downplays that fact. We are 
not there, at the front of the classroom, to display our knowledge as a 
substitute for our students gaining their own knowledge of these matters 
and having their own experience of learning them. When we teachers 
elicit the answer that we expected to elicit by means of the question we 
just asked, it may be cause for personal or professional gratification, but 
this pedagogi,cal pleasure is not something that we need (or ought) to 
share with our students. We are not there to discover what we can do 
(unless we conceive ourselves to be engaged in a teaching experiment); 
rather, we are there to help them discover what they can do (for 
themselves, by themselves, with some initial help or provocation from 
us). 
When I ask my students questions to which (I think) I know the 
answers, I have no intention of fooling them, and that is not what I am 
doing. They can see in a sense (or, soon enough, it becomes fairly 
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obvious to them), by the nature of questions I ask and their sequence or 
structure, their logic, that often I know the answers to the questions I 
am asking my students (although, again, I do not emphasize this fact, 
and in fact try to downplay it). I conceive of myself, in this regard, as 
still going through an inquiry when I do this, a true inquiry or 
investigation-only, it is an inquiry that is both the same and slightly 
different from the one my students are going through. Let me try to 
describe their inquiry first. 
I focus their attention in class on the materials at hand and ask 
questions about those materials, thereby trying to get them to discover 
what they (or we) can make out of these materials. We all are engaged 
in this same process of trying to make something useful or something 
legally recognizable and effective out of the materials the law gives us, 
but the responsibility is mainly theirs to do this. As some law teachers 
are notorious for saying (in my generation, it was Professor Kingsfield 
of The Paper Chase fame), "We law teachers don't teach you the law, you 
students do that; we teach you how to think." In certain contexts this 
claim is simply fatuous (when, for example, it is an attempt to escape 
the teacher's responsibility for teaching what he or she knows about 
these materials). In other contexts the claim is downright false. We do 
not teach our students how to think. They already know how to think, 
and they already have minds of their own. (If they did not, they would 
not be in law school. More to the point, if they did not already know 
how to think in general, then we could not teach them anything in law 
school.) We teach them, rather, ways to use their minds, how they may 
wish to think (if they choose to do so). We are demonstrating for the 
edification of our students-and, thus, we are training them in-tech-
niques of thinking, ways of applying (or developing) the thinking skills 
they already possess. 
When properly invoked, then, this claim can serve as a useful 
reminder that it is primarily the law students' responsibility to discover 
what these materials come to mean legally. Our teaching can only 
partially and incompletely convey what these materials mean (or can be 
made to mean), The primary lesson is not what we teachers have 
managed to make out of the law (as a: resource or a repository of legal 
problems and legal problem-solving material), but rather what our 
students find out they are capable of making out of the law. 
At the same time, how~ver, the students are watching both their 
fellow students and me, their teacher, even as they focus on the 
materials at hand. I am (or may be) criticizing their attempts at law-
making at any time during their performances, their recitations in front 
of the class, and I am also giving performances oflaw-making myself, for 
their edification. So too their fellow students. Thus, the students must 
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try to watch me and to see what I am doing with these same cases and 
materials, ~ven while they themselves recite or watch another student 
recite. (This duality of focus in. their inquiry is one reason why it is 
imperative: that the students prepare the assigned materials prior to 
class; they simply cannot watch me and the other students work on the 
materials at the same time if they have not already spent sufficient time 
on their own with the materials.) 
The foclis of the students' inquiry is bifurcated between the materials 
on the one hand and, on the other, either themselves or another student 
or myself a,s their teacher. My inquiry is similarly fragmented, but it 
has slightly different objects of its focus. I am looking at the materials 
and trying to see what becomes of them tinder the scrutiny of attention 
and work that we devote to them in class, and I am watching the 
students as they perform their recitations. I also am watching 
something else as well. I am watching myself teach them, and them 
learning, atld therefore I am trying to take in or focus on the class-as-a-
whole, the t;.!lass conceived of as a unit of human activity and education, 
not me-anq-them, but us. 
This last;is an object of my attention because I have goals or objectives 
for the clas~ and I have particular lessons or themes that I want to cover 
during the class, and I cannot lose sight of these by losing myself in the 
discussion. If I do lose track of the over-arching lesson plan, while the 
imaginative interplay and discussion may be immediate and rewarding, 
the long-term losses may turn out to be severe.9 Thus, I am trying to 
I 
do three tb:ings at once: to see what weare making of the materials at 
hand; to w~tch the students perform; and to determine how we are doing 
as a class. That is one reason why I too had better be well-prepared 
when I get to class, why I too had better have read and studied the 
materials prior to class. 
I am trying to understand the materials, just as my students are; I am 
also trying'to understand my students, what they are doing, and what 
they are becoming; and I am taking responsibility for the progress of the 
class and ti-ying to see that it is productive for all involved. Whether my 
questions f\re asked in the context of what I have called an "exercise," or 
in the context of what I have called a "true inquiry," I am always trying 
to do thes¢ three things at once. From my perspective, then, what 
distinguishes the two scenes of instruction-"exercises" from "true 
inquiries" -'-is not the presence or absence of these three teaching goals, 
9. This is another reason why I said (supra note 4) that I find that I need an awareness 
of the structure of the lesson plan for each class, and that even innovation and improvisa-
tion begin with a script. 
HeinOnline -- 45 Mercer L. Rev. 600 1993-1994
600 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
but rather their mix or balance within the p~icular scene ofinstruction 
that at the moment happens to be taking place. 
When I ask questions of my students to which I do not know the 
answers, I am apt to be primarily interested in understanding the 
materials we are studying at the moment-be they from Property or 
Estates & Trusts or Land Use-and I am looking for enlightenment on 
those materials from my students. But their responses can also tell me 
a lot about what kind of lawyers my students are becoming (or are 
failing to become), and they also can make me pleased or worried about 
the progress of the class. In this context especially-asking questions 
with unknown answers-the risk to the class progress can be great. The 
danger is that, by following out the implications of a question whose 
answer I do not know, I myself do not know the parameters of the 
discussion that I am getting the class into, or that I am allowing it to get 
into, and thus I do not know the bridges from that discussion to the 
remainder of my lesson plan. This is more truly an inquiry because I do 
not know the way out and I do not know beforehand what way out may 
become available to us (as I normally know when I ask a question to 
which I have anticipated the answer). 
When I ask questions of my students to which I do know the answers, 
I am apt to be primarily interested in learning what they are making 
out of themselves as lawyers and only secondarily interested in the 
materials that we are studying at the moment, or the immediate 
progress of the class. These matters can change in their primacy, 
however, depending upon the extent to which the answers I receive to 
my questions do or do not surprise me, do or do not conflict with my 
expectations. 
My response, then, to my students who might feel contempt for what 
we are doing in class, were they to see that at least some of the time, my 
questions are meant to "rehearse" answers that I know already, is the 
following. "Yes, often I do know the answers to the questions I ask. But 
you do not; or, at least, I cannot be sure that you do, until I have learned 
that you know the answers. I cannot learn this by lecturing to you. If 
I were to lecture to you, if I were to give the answers to you that I have, 
then that would tell you what I know, but it would not tell me what you 
know. And this is at least a part of what I, as your teacher, want to 
know; I want to know what you know. In addition, however, my 
lecturing to you, my giving you the answers that I have, would not help 
you in perhaps the way in which you might think it would, because law 
is not a matter of having answers; it is a matter of gaining answers, of 
creating answers, out of the materials that the law affords to lawyers. 
This skill-the . ability to gain or to create answers out of legal materi-
als-cannot be tested or ascertained by my lecturing to you, by my 
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giving you the answers. That would only demonstrate that I have the 
skill.or ability we desire' as lawyers, that I can create an answer out of 
the materials at hand. What I want to know-and what you too should 
want to know, even if you do not yet want to know it (perhaps because 
you fear th~ answer to that question)-is whether you have this skill or 
ability. And both you and I can learn this about you only by my asking 
you to perform the skill. or to exercise the ability in my sight and 
hearing, so that I may judge it and help you with it. That is what I am 
supposed to do as a teacher, to help you become a good lawyer. I cannot 
do that by giving you answers; rather, I can do this only by asking 
questions of you, frustrating as this may be, and seeing how you 
respond." 
Students learn any number of important lessons in this way, and some 
of them are positive. They learn, for example, that for all of the terrible 
ambiguity and vagueness in the law, there are on .some occasions in 
some locales of the law some definite answers to some definite questions. 
This is the case, for instance, in my Property course whEm we discuss 
some of the problems that can arise in the area of landlord-tenant law, 
or those iJ1. the area of future interests and the dread Rule Against 
Perpetuities. It also is the case in my Legal Ethics course when we 
discuss certain potential conflict-of-interest problems. It is not the case 
in my Property course, on the other hand, when we discuss much of 
,"Takings" iaw; or in my Legal Ethics course when we discuss some 
disclosure-of-client-confidences problems. Some legal materials permit 
more definite answers than other legal materials (given sufficiently 
definite questions or problems raised in a sufficiently definite context or 
factual setting), and this is something about the law that it is worth-
while that students learn.10 
There are other lessons to be learned from such a process of teaching 
as well, and some of these lessons are harder to swallow. I am thinking 
in particular of what my students learn from the kind of questioning 
they receive in class (as I described it earlier). When I hear them say 
something' wrong or misleading in response to one of my questions, I 
said that 'I stop them.ll Why do I do this? What do I want my 
students to learn in this situation? 
10. This ~s one reason why I wish to dissent from some of the remarks made by Paul 
Hayden abou,t right and wrong answers in law school. See supra note 7. 
11. On several occasions, I have received comments on student evaluation forms that 
my continual interruptions of my students are an irritating habit of mine (distracting, and 
impolite as well). This may be an inevitable cost of what I see as the benefits of such a 
teaching technique-but I do not want to deny that this reaction means that I have to 
continually rethink both the efficacy and the ethics of this way of teaching. 
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1 want them to learn, first and foremost, that they do not know 
something that they think they know. This is a very important lesson 
to learn. Yet, it is equally important not to take the lesson too far, or 
not to draw the wrong inference from this lesson. The right inference to 
draw is, "I thought 1 knew, but 1 did not in fact know, when 1 said that 
1 knew. How could this have happened to me?" This lesson humbles the 
speaker, at least momentarily, and makes the speaker go back over the 
grounds or bases for his claim to have known, checking and rechecking 
his facts or his experience, or both, giving them some more thought. 
This is all to the good; it may make our students more thoughtful. And 
it may even make each student more circumspect as to what he or she 
claims to know. This too is all to the good; we lawyers could use some 
humility, and some hesitancy, in claiming to know things. But one of 
the wrong inferences to draw would be this: "Since 1 don't know here 
and now what 1 claimed to know, then 1 never can know; 1 never can (or 
should) claim to know anything." This would be an absurd conclusion 
to draw from this experience, and yet it is the frame of mind that in 
philosophy we call "skepticism." 
1 shall try to say later why 1 think that skepticism is an incorrect 
inference to draw from this humbling experience, but for the moment 1 
want to note that there is something else as well that 1 as a teacher 
hope to gain from this kind of questioning. 1 said above that 1 hope the 
student will recognize his or her lack of knowledge in a context where 
he or she has claimed to know something. Secondly, 1 want a recogni-
tion on the part of the student that the way out of this mess, this fix, is 
through himself or herself, not through me. 1 realize that 1 can provide 
some temporary relief for their befuddlement, and given sufficient need 
and sufficient cause, 1 often will step in and offer an argument or a fact 
or a rule that may settle the dilemma raised by my preceding question. 
This is only a temporary solution; it affords only temporary relief. 
Nothing 1 do or say can save my students from the professional 
challenges they have before them; those problems and dilemmas are 
there in the materials and in life and nothing 1 can do could remove 
them (I am not certain that 1 would even if 1 could, but 1 suspect that 1 
might try). The way out is through themselves, and not through me.12 
This is the second lesson 1 hope or expect them to learn from this form 
of questioning. 
12. I have suggested elsewhere that this insight into the student's responsibility for 
finding a solution to the problems that plague him or her in the law, can be one goal of a 
course in Jurisprudence. See Thomas D. Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer: The 
Imaginative Pursuit of Implications and Possibilities, 54 TENN. L. REV. 345, 346-49 (1987). 
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It is the peculiar genius of the early and middle dialogues of Plato, 
which portray Socrates at his best, that they seem to me to teach these 
same two lessons (and it is not something taught solely by Plato or 
Socrates; I find very similar lessons in Wittgenstein's later philosophy). 
The dual lessons of Socrates' teaching and questioning are these: 
1. You don't know what you think you know. 
2. You know more (or other) than what you think (you knoW).13 
These lessons are taught in many ways in many contexts and in many 
forms, but basically they are repeated throughout the early and middle 
dialogues, and they seem to me to express the essence of Socrates' 
teaching.14 What do they mean? 
The first lesson is a lesson in self-knowledge and it results in what I 
am calling "bitter knowledge,"lI; knowledge gained by disillusionment. 
13. This particular way of fonnulating the dual lessons of Socrates' teaching came to 
me while I prepared for some introductory classes with entering students at the College 
of Law in the University of Tennessee in the late 1980s. In the secondary literature on 
Socrates and his teaching, I have not found anyone who fonnulates the lessons of the early 
and middle dialogues this way, and I believe that my fonnulation is original. But, in 
revising this essay for publication, I came across Gregory Vlastos' recent book on Socrates, 
which contains certain cryptic comments that I find supportive of my fonnula. 
Socrates' central paradox . , . [is) his profession of ignorance. He asserts that he 
has no knowledge, none whatever, not a smidgin of it, "no wisdom, great or small" 
. . .. But he speaks and lives, serenely confident that he has a goodly stock of 
it-sufficient for the quotidian pursuit of virtue. And he implies as much in what 
he says. To keep faith with Socrates' strangeness some way has to be found to 
save both the assertion of his ignorance and the implied negation. 
. .. [I)rony served as the vehicle of his profession of ignorance, [which is] 
intelligible only if [it is] understood to disclaim one sort of knowledge, while 
claiming another in the same breath. 
GREGORY VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRON 1ST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER 3, 13 (1991) (emphases 
in original; footnote omitted). See also my earlier article on Socrates' teaching in the 
Protagoras: supra note 2, at 496. 
14. What follows is a summary statement of some of the implications of Socratic 
questioning as I understand them. I have worked out more fully the structure of Socratic 
questioning and the dual lessons that it teaches in my companion essay, The Poverty of 
Socratic Question.in.g (forthcoming), supra note 3. 
15. I am led'to this label in part by the following remarks of Stanley Cavell on the 
nature of self-knowledge: 
Both [Freud' and Wittgenstein) thought of their negative soundings as revolution-
ary extensions of our knowledge. and both were obsessed by the idea. or fact, that 
they would be misunderstood-partly, doubtless, because they knew the taste of 
self-knowledge, that it is bitter. It will be time to blame them for taking 
misunderstanding by their disciples as personal betrayal when we know that the 
ignorance of oneself is a refusal to know. 
STANLEY CAVEL~, The Availability ofWittgenstein's Later Philosophy, in MUST WE MEAN 
WHAT WE SAY? 44, 72 (1969). 
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The disillusionment is a product of a student not knowing himself or 
herself well enough, and it is a lesson taught by defeating.the expecta-
tions and hopes of the student. 1b the extent that a student begins a 
class or a schooling by thinking that he or she already knows how to 
deal with the materials or the problems or the questions given him or 
her, this is arrogance. It needs to be defeated,' and it is defeated by the 
method of Socratic questioning. I want to discuss in particular this facet 
of law teaching in the next section of my paper. 
It is not enough to leave the matter there; that would leave the 
student crushed or defeated, and I take it that such an attitude is not 
what we are seeking in education, either in law school or in any other 
school. Thus, we law teachers need to see that disillusionment in and 
of itself is not enough, is not sufficient education for our students, and 
hence it is not all of what we must ask of ourselves and our teaching. 
Something else is needed. This "something else" -which I am 'claiming 
is a necessary part of the Socratic method-is what I discuss in the 
fourth section of this essay. 
III. THE GOOD OF DISILLUSIONMENT:, BITTER KNOWLEDGE 
In this section, I want to concentrate on what r am calling the right 
inference to draw from the experience that I tried to describe above: the 
experience where I stop a student who is trying to answer one of my 
questions and I indicate to them that they are wrong about something, 
that they do not know what they think they know. This is, I claim, a 
failure of self-knowledge. 16 
In drawing the right inference from this failure, it is important that 
we recognize that Socratic questioning takes place in a context where the 
student volunteers to state the case or to recite some particular problem. 
I mentioned this fact in passing while generating my description of how 
I teach, but I did not emphasize it too much, exactly because I wanted 
to see whether or not it would seem significant to my reader if I did not 
emphasize it; I suspect that it did not. For, after all, we teachers have 
the power to call on our students' to state cases or recite problems in 
class; why does it matter whether we exercise that power, or whether 
instead the students volunteer to state the case? 
16. I acknowledge later in this essay that it may turn out that the lack of self-
knowledge is mine and not the student's. Then the revelation of one's ignorance will once 
again have been achieved by means of Socratic questioning. (Sometimes it is the Socratic 
questioner who refutes himself or herself. This was true of Socrates too. See my earlier 
essay on the Apology: "Never Mind the Manner of My Speech," 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 253, 270-
74 (1990).) 
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It matter!3 because if the students are called on-rather than acting 
as volunteers-then they really have not put themselves in the position 
of having claimed to know. And that position is the one that I very 
much want them to be in; rather, it is the position I want them to put 
themselves 'in when speaking and acting in my class. If instead I call on 
a student, then he or she mayor may not know the answer to my 
question. But the mere fact that it turns out that he or she does not 
know the answer does not teach the lesson that I specifically want to 
teach; rather, it shows only that the student does not happen to know a 
particular piece of information that at the moment I seek. But the 
student's J.I)erely not knowing this piece of information does not refute 
the student at all, because he or she never claimed to know in the first 
place. I put the burden of answering on that student's shoulders; he or 
she did not assume or accept it voluntarily. 
The situation that I want to create in the classroom is where the 
student for all the world to see is claiming to know something. In this 
context, that claim means something (says something) personal about 
the claimant; it almost functions as a proud boast before his or her 
peers. It is a claim to expertise, to professional accomplishment, before 
a jury of peers, all of whom are also trying to achieve professional status. 
In such a context, I am sure that the claim to know will be both 
strenuously tested (or contested) and vehemently defended. That is 
good; I w~nt that commitment of the self to the self's words (just as 
Socrates wanted it too, in his conversations that turned into elenchic 
refutations that brought about humiliation).17 
17. About the nature ofelenchus in Socrates' dialectical method, James Boyd White 
says: 
The one who claims to know knows nothing after all. This is the elenchus, or 
refutation, of which Socrates repeatedly speaks, and it is the heart of dialectic. 
It result;s in a mortification or humiliation of a special kind, for one is mortified 
by the invocation not of new facts or ideas but of what one already knows or 
claims ~ know. One part of the selfis appealed to against another part, and in 
the process a previously unknown self-contradiction is revealed . 
. . . [A] dialectical refutation (elenchos) requires that one make the other agree 
with what one says. . . . What matters between us is not the other witnesses who 
can be brought forward to support your view or mine but whether you can make 
me your witness or I can make you mine. For dialectic to exert its full force upon 
the individual mind, complete frankness is essential, a kind of shamelessness in 
saying what one really thinks. 
JAMES BoYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LoSE THEIR MEANING 95, 102 (1984). 
I have sald more about elenchus in my article, "Never Mind the Manner of My Speech, " 
supra note 16, at 274-75. 
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I said that what most often happens in class is that I stop the student 
who claims to know and ask him or her questions, which he or she 
cannot answer-as it turns out. But I do not know whether or not he or 
she can answer them when I ask my questions-that is, they are 
genuine, good-faith efforts to determine whether the student who has 
volunteered to speak really knows what he or she is talking about. 
When a student claims to know, but then discovers in fact that he or she 
does not know, they are chagrined. They have made a mistake, and a 
serious one; it can leads to disillusionment. But not just any mistake 
and its recognition lead to disillusionment; not every error and not every 
correction have the power to disillusion a person. What is it specifically 
about this teaching by this kind of questioning that has this power, the 
power to disillusion a person? 
First, as I have been saying, it is the fact that the student volunteered 
to speak. In this situation, he or she voluntarily put themselves forward 
as knowing what needs to be known in order to answer the question. 
They claimed to know in this situation. IS Theirs is a claim to know 
both something about the world and something about themselves: "I 
know that I know something about the world." It is particularly 
disillusioning for them to learn that they do not know. "I have mistaken 
both the world and myself. What else is there?! What else might I more 
easily or more fully know than my particular chosen professional world 
(here, the professional legal materials assigned for mastery by today's 
session)? Whom else might I more easily or fully know than myself? If 
18. In response to my claim that it is important to have law students volunteer to 
answer in class, I have been told that to characterize them as "volunteers" is false. In most 
law schools, this critic says, students speak not voluntarily but from a sense of implicit 
coercion. And, it is further said, even purported volunteers feel coerced into speaking: 
they know and understand that they are expected to participate in class, and that in fact 
their final grade can be lowered ifthey fail to participate in class discussion (this is true 
in my classes). . 
This criticism is an important comment on my description oflaw school teaching, but it 
also may go too far. On this alternative understanding, I am not certain but that it 
becomes impossible to ever characterize anyone as "volunteering" (since they always may 
be acting out of a response to external rewards and punishments). I think such an 
alternative means that we have lost, or are at risk oflosing, our concept of voluntary action 
in law school teaching. But, in addition, this alternative understanding shows at most that 
volunteering is a rare phenomenon in law school; it does not show that my claims about 
the logic or the dynamics of volunteering are wrong. (A more complete response to this 
objection would explore how comfortable or uncomfortable-how threatened or intimidated 
[or the reversel-students feel in any given law school class. But I find it difficult to assess 
the extent to which student participation in law school discussions is truly voluntary, 
without also looking at the nature and quality of the teaching going on in a given class.) 
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I don't kno'w my professional world, then ,what do I know? If I don't 
know myse~f, then whom do I knoW?,,19 
There sUrely is some pride expressed in such a representation, a 
placing of the self in front of other people (especially in front of one's 
peers), and the consequent bursting of that pride-when one discovers 
that in fact he or she does not know-has the power to make the 
volunteeriI1g student feel embittered and disillusioned. Then, too, there 
is the pecu~iar public nature of the humiliation. Having one's errors and 
mistakes h;anded back to oneself on a public platter is more difficult to 
dismiss or deny, and less easy to swallow, than would be the private 
correction of one's errors and mistakes during a tutorial. Finally, in 
addition to' the lack of self-knowledge that such refutation shows, the 
lack of professional mastery it displays, and the public nature of the 
humiliatiox) (in front of one's peers) that it performs, there is this: the 
student is rejected for all to see by someone most students respect-the 
teacher. I~ this not adequate reason for disillusionment? I think it 
is.20 
Socrates' teaching can be understood to be both empowered by and 
enjoined by the Delphic maxim, "Know thyself.,,21 This maxim traces 
19. The ~ay in which I am formulating these doubts is directly indebted to Stanley 
Cavell's analysis of the opening moments in traditional philosophical skepticism. While 
I am not in a position to use this material in any concerted way here, I want to draw 
attention to the possibilities of pursuing these lines of inquiry elsewhere. Cavell's 
generating question in his inquiry of skepticism is, specifically, "How does the failure of a 
I 
particular cla,im seem to cast doubt on the validity of knowledge as a whole?" STANLEY 
CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: WI'ITGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY 135 
(1979). See a,lso id. at 135-40. And see also my remarks in the text, infra, at note 32. 
20. I am *ot claiming here that disillusionment occurs each and every time a student 
is corrected in the classroom. While I do claim that disillusionment is an effect that 
Socratic teaching produces (intentionally), I am saying that it is the cumulative impact of 
such teaching that leads naturally, normally, to disillusionment. Given this kind of 
teaching and 'sufficient repetitions of its lessons, we can anticipate this kind of result-and 
this is what we mean to do as teachers. (See also my remarks in the text, infra, at note 
32.) 
21. It is reported that this saying was inscribed over the threshold of the temple at 
Delphi. 
, (A]t Delphi the educational power of Greek religion reached its maximum, and 
spread fi;om there far beyond the frontiers of Hellas. The wise sayings of sages 
were ded,icated to Apollo and inscribed in his temple, since their worldly wisdom 
was only: a reflection of his divine wisdom. And at his door his worshippers saw 
the comxhand Know thyself - the doctrine of sophrosyne, by which men learn to 
remembJr the limits of human power and ambition, expressed in the legislative 
form that was characteristic of the age. 
WERNER JAEGER, 1 PAIDElA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 167 (G. Highet trans. 2d ed. 
1945) (emphases in original; footnote omitted). ' 
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the source of his success, and its limit, and, in so far as we proceed in 
the manner of questioning that I have been describing, the maxim also 
befits law teaching. By means of Socratic questioning, we force students 
to recognize something about themselves, something unpleasant but 
undeniably true. It is this fact of combined unpleasantness and 
undeniable (or unavoidable) truth that makes such self-knowledge 
bitter.22 It seems to me that this way of teaching law amounts to 
forcing our students to acknowledge their ignorance in three different 
ways, all of which lead our students to learn by disillusionment. 
First, teaching done this way is teaching based upon forcing the 
student to see something about himself or herself. If I do not just tell a 
student that he or she is wrong, but actually show him or her that he or 
she has said something wrong or has gotten something incorrect, then 
I am forcing a piece of self-knowledge on that student. They must 
recognize this about themselves-that this is what they did, or that that 
is what they said-and they must do this before we can go on with the 
lesson, before we can continue the' conversation or discussion. (This is 
one reason why I interrupt my students and do not allow them to 
continue: I want to enact the breakdo~n in communication that has 
occurred.) Of course, sometimes they do not recognize this about 
themselves-that they have gotten something wrong or that they have 
spoken incorrectly or falsely-either because they cannot manage to 
recognize it or cannot bear to see it (out of denial) and, as I have said, 
In The Apology, Socrates justifies his teaching method in part by saying that he was told 
that the Delphic oracle said that no one was wiser than Socrates. See PLATO, The Apology, 
in. EUTHYPHRO, APoLOGY, CRlTO 25 [21a] (F.J. Church & Robert D, Cumming trans. ,2d rev. 
ed. 1956). Yet Socrates knew that he did not know. Putting these together-he knew 
himself well enough to know that he was ignorant, and the oracle said that no one was 
wiser than he-this seems to mean (and meant to Socrates) that all of his interlocutors 
failed to know what they thought they knew. So Socrates takes as one of his purposes in 
life the effort to show others that they do not know what they think they know. 
The Delphic saying, "Know thyself," also comes under Socratic scrutiny in the Charmides 
and the Protagoras. See PLATO, Charmides, in. LACHES AND CHARMIDES 76, 80 [165a, 167al 
(Rosamond Kent Sprague trans. 1973); and PLATO, PROTAGORAS 46 [343b] (Benjamin 
Jowett & Martin Ostwald trans. 1956). 
22. I have thought about the ways in which this knowledge can be said to be bitter. 
(1) It is bitter because it is unwanted. It comes to us or our students unbidden, unasked 
for, unsought. (2) It is bitter also because it is unacceptable. It tells us something about 
ourselves and our world that we do not like to hear or do not want to know. It also stings 
our pride or our vanity. So it requires an acknowledgment from us before it can truly 
become an operative portion of our understanding of ourselves and the world. This 
acknowledgment, this acceptance, is hard to swallow or to stomach. (3) It also is bitter 
because it is undeniable; the proof is there, right in front of us, and this makes it a hard 
truth-but undeniable. So it confronts us, even haunts us, until we relent. Yet,we reject 
it because it is so bitter. 
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I am forced then to move on to another student. Still, the force and 
effect of :r;ny teaching are that unless and until the students can 
recognize something about themselves (what they did or said when 
asked to tecite the case), they cannot go on (in my class). This is 
frustrating teaching, but also very powerful teaching because it blocks 
their natural urge to go on with their training. Such teaching tends to 
I 
foster self-lroowledge not because it makes self-knowledge any less bitter 
or any easier to swallow, but because it makes self-knowledge necessary. 
The secOnd way in which this teaching produces self-knowledge is that· 
I • 
it forces the student to see that he or she has misread or mistaken 
something: in the world. The materials that we use in the law are 
primarily ;written-case reports, statutes, administrative regulations, 
scholarly j~)Urnals, and the like-and these are a part of our world, they 
are object$ in the world (as are the actions of the people discussed within 
these writ{ngs). The second lesson in self-knowledge taught Socratically 
is that the'se objects in the world may not be what they appear to be (or 
they may not say what they appear to say), and so we must be careful 
with them and must proceed cautiously. This is commonly what we 
teach when we ask students to state the holding of a case because 
commonly we expect them to be misled by something in the opinion, 
something that leads them to state the holding incorrectly. 
This is a, second lesson in self-knowledge, and it is not the same as the 
first lessol;1. The first lesson involves the student's need to recognize 
that he or, she is wrong about something as to himself or herself. The 
student th;ought that he or she knew something when in fact he or she 
did not. :aut the second lesson teaches the student that he or she also 
is wrong ~bout something in the world other than himself or herself. 
This secoIid lesson is the different lesson that the world can fool us or 
I 
that the ~orld can be other than what it appears to be. This is not the 
same as ~aying that we are deluding ourselves about the world; that 
would be ~nother lesson about us, not about the world. Illusions in the 
world are not delusions we create, but rather· are aspects of the world 
that fool qs into thinking that they are something that in fact they are 
not.23 (Mirages and other optical illusions are the paradigm instances 
of this second type of problem.24) 
23. If I delude myself about something, I am being foolish; if I am the victim of (or fall 
prey to) an (nusion, I am being fooled. 
24. The philosophical "argument from illusion" is thoroughly and helpfully analyzed in 
ways pertinent to the present discussion in Austin's set oflecture notes: See J. L. AUSTIN, 
SENSE AND SENSIBILIA (G. J. Warnock ed. 1961). For his careful distinction between 
illusions an4 delusions, see id. at 22·26. 
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The third and final lesson in self-knowledge taught Socratically is in 
a sense the most difficult and galling lesson to learn because it is the 
most threatening for our students at this point in their careers: it forces 
them to see that their teacher does not accept what they say and does 
not accept their answer to the question that the teacher has asked. 
Since the teacher is their representative for the profession to which they 
want to belong and to which they currently are in the position of 
aspirant or apprentice, this represents the profession's rejection of them. 
In addition, it is the simultaneous rejection of them by their teacher, 
someone whom the students are apt to respect. 1b have this evidence 
of rejection, to receive this opinion of one's legal skills, and especially to 
have or receive it face-to-face in front of one's peers, is devastating. It 
says to the aspirant: you have failed to act as a professional would act 
imd you have failed to be initiated into the profession. It is the third 
and final element of self-knowledge in this scene of instruction, and it 
is perhaps the worst or most difficult to acknowledge. (Did I say 
something about "bitter" knowledge?) 
All of this talk about the Socratic method as a means to self-knowl-
edge can seem-can be-dismayingly, disturbingly smug, as though the 
method were some sort of antiseptic tool, rather than what it is: the 
personal assault on one's mind or one's way of thinking, seeing, and 
speaking. Who are these teachers who think that they have the right to 
cause such pain, disillusionment, and humiliation to the student? 
This series of questions expresses a real discomfort created by this 
method of teaching, but it places the discomfort in the wrong light. As 
I understand it, Socratic teaching does not proceed as a matter of right. 
Rather, it proceeds as a matter of need. The only justification for 
teaching this way, as well as the sole good of teaching this way, comes 
from a belief that it is needed: it is a necessary response to certain 
human constants (constants in human experience, human life,language, 
and law). 
As Stanley Cavell suggests in the motto to this essay, the justification 
for such teaching "must be ... based on a true knowledge of what our 
illusions are."25 And is it'? The Socratic method of questioning and 
answering is directed toward discovering self-ignorance-the fact that a 
person does not realize that he or she does not know what they claim to 
know-and toward revealing that fact to that person. In this respect, I 
think Socrates' method is based upon "true knowledge of what our 
illusions are." I believe that ignorance of the self is a shared condition 
of human beings, a firmament in human experience. I would venture to 
25. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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say that our continued susceptibility to a kind of unconscious ignorance, 
and also our human pride or even arrogance in our powers of knowing, 
trace a continuity of human nature or human experience. These 
attributes of human fallibility and frailty have always been with us and 
will always be with us. They are constants of human life and experi-
ence, and in this sense they are necessary parts of the structure of our 
lives and ~xperience.26 Since we cannot escape them, we must learn to 
live with them. This includes learning, to the extent that we can, how 
to deal with them. The Socratic method is one way of dealing with them 
(I do not say that it is the only way). 
All of this may be true, but it leaves pending a concern over the 
element of humiliation in such teaching. Is it really necessary to 
humiliate students in order to teach them that they do not know what 
they think they know? I would say, yes and no. Humiliation is not 
necessary if it implies (or to the extent that it implies) any kind of 
ridicule heaped on a student, either by a teacher or by the other 
students, or any abuse of the imbalance of power between teacher and 
student. Teaching that countenances ridicule (Socratic or otherwise) is 
destructive, not productive. But "humiliation" derives its meaning not 
from a notion of ridicule, but rather from a root in humility. To teach 
humility in what one claims to know-a training to some caution in 
what one claims to know and how one expresses it and exactly how one 
says what one means in claiming to know what one knows-is a noble 
enterprise; it is a goal that encompasses values that are at the core of 
Western education and philosophy. 
26. Emerson, 'if I read him correctly, believed that illusions were a necessary part of 
human life and experience: 
Dream delivers us to dream, and there is no end to illusion. Life is a train of 
moods l~ke a string of beads, and, as we pass through them, they prove to be 
many-colored lenses which paint the world their own hue, and each shows only 
what lies in its focus .... 
The secret of the illusoriness is in the necessity of a succession of moods or 
objects. Gladly we would anchor, but the anchorage is quicksand. ' This onward 
trick of nature is too strong for us: Pero si muove. When, at night, I look at the 
moon and stars, I seem stationary, and they to hurry. Our love of the real draws 
us to permanence, but health of body consists in circulation, and sanity of mind 
in variety or facility of association. We need change of objects. Dedication to one 
thought is quickly odious. 
RALPH WALQO EMERSON, Experience, in ESSAYS & LECTURES 469, 473, 476 (Joel Porte ed. 
1983) (originally published in 1844). 
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Iv. ENGENDERING RENEWED EFFORT OUT OF DISILLUSIONMENT 
I do not appeal to disillusionment in teaching as though it were 
unproblematic or an unmixed good; itis in fact a troubling phenomenon. 
It is troubling in part because the word "disillusionment" is ambiguous 
without more being given of its context. The dictionary tells us that this 
term can refer either to a positive experience-namely, the removal of 
one's misleading illusions; or it can refer to a negative experi-
ence-namely, the loss of hope leading to disenchantment.27 So the 
word "disillusionment" at one and the same time captures both the 
freedom or release that one can experience in gaining enlightenment by 
losing one's illusions, and the loss of hope or self-confidence that being 
disabused of one's illusions can bring in its train. The release from 
. illusions is good, but the pain and despair bred from the disillusioning 
experience are difficult to· accept.28 Has disillusionment always had 
this dual aspect? 
We may find ourselves, in this regard, again learning from Plato. His 
brief statement of the "myth of the cave" in The Republic is perhaps 
Western culture's paradigmatic image of the duality of the experience of 
disillusionment.29 The educational effort to drag the captives from the 
shadows of the cave into the glaring sunlight of the world as it stands, 
is painful and depressing; it is resisted by those who find the old reality 
more acceptable, less painful, and more real. Yet, the captives want 
enlightenment, and, yes, they want release and the freedom that 
knowledge of reality will give them (or so they would say if they were 
27. See 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFoRD ENGLISH J)ICTIONARY 752 (1971). 
28. . Tom Shaffer has told me with his usual grace and force that what I am calling 
"disillusionment," others (including himself) might wish to call something else, perhaps 
"temporary discouragement" or "gentle humiliation." True disillusionment is disenchant-
ment, he claims, a true malaise of the heart or soul, a kind of hopelessness. 
I do not deny this negative aspect of disillusionment, and Imean to be trading upon just 
this potency of meaning in the word throughout this essay. It can imply disenchantment 
and hopelessness. But I do not think that it must mean this, because "disillusionment" 
carries with it (linguistically or structurally) the other potency of meaning, namely, a lifting 
of illusions that have held one captive. If I am wrong about this, and if this essay does not 
help to show this duality to be an essential component of Socratic teaching, then I have 
failed. 
It is my hope that in this essay I show in some small way that teaching by disillusion-
ment can be good, can be productive, and that it need not be destructive or disenchanting. 
Yet I cannot deny (and do not wish to deny) the continued threat of destructive 
disenchantment that teaching by disillusionment holds, because I think it is there and 
because I think it is a continual issue with which teachers using the Socratic method must 
conjure. 
29. See THE REpUBLIC OF PLATO 193-96 [514a-517a1 (A. Bloom trans. 1968). 
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asked). But the shock and pain of this educational effort are almost 
unendurable. For some, they are unendurable; and what these people 
most wish 'for is respite and retreat back into the comfort of the cave and 
its shadows. (Who is it who said that humans cannot bear too much 
reality?)30 'Something is gained in the educational effort, but something 
else is just as surely lost, and the gain is bitter comfort for the 10SS.31 
'The positive' side of disillusionment is our realization that we were 
mistaken fl.bout something. In this way we come to know through the 
explicit prlJcess of removing the scales from our eyes, ridding ourselves 
of ill~sions that, until now, have prevented us from seeing what is true, 
what is the case. Yet the negative side of this therapy is that we also 
realize tha,t we were mistaken about something. In this way we come to 
know through the explicit process of admitting that we got something 
wrong abo:ut the world, that the world is something other than what we 
thought or; expected it to be (and in this respect, the world as an object 
of knowledge very much includes ourselves). This realization disap-
points us,and perhaps we even despair of ever getting the world right, 
of ever kn9wing or understanding it (including ourselves). 
Such disappointment or despair over our ability to know, such 
disillusionment, seems to lead naturally to skepticism. I said earlier 
that skepticism is one wrong inference to draw from the experience of 
disillusion~ment,32 but it seems almost inevitable that our students will 
draw it. 'For who-subjected to the day-after-day criticism of one's 
claims to know the law in any particular case, or to know what a statute 
says, or to know how to apply a specific rule (or to know any of a 
number o"other things about law)-would not become skeptical of his or 
her powers to come to know anything? 
The despair and humiliation in law teaching are manifest; but they 
are both natural and necessary. We humans tend to become infatuated 
30. It was T. S. Eliot, in the "Burnt Norton" portion of the Four Quartets. See T. S. 
ELIOT, Four Quartets, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS, 1909-1950 117, 118 (1971)(" ... 
human kimYCannot bear very much reality"). 
31. This phenomenon is explored by James Boyd White in his book, The Legal 
Imagination. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 10-13, 689-94 (1973). 
See also Thomas D. Eisele, The Legal Imagination and. Language, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 363, 
I 
410-11 (1976). , 
32. I am not happy here with calling "skepticism" an "inference" that we draw from our 
disillusioning experience. I think that, truly speaking, skepticism is more a mood or an 
attitude th~ it is an inference; and this change in characterization has implications for 
how we shou,ld respond to skepticism (the threat and the allure of it), for whether we think 
that skeptic~sm is capable of refutation, and even for whether or not we find it to be a 
natural hunj.an reaction to certain situations and experiences. I cannot go into more 
details about this now, but I can point the reader to the best book available discussing this 
matter: STA,NLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON, supra note 19. 
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or enchanted with what we know (or \Yhat we think we know), and we 
find it disenchanting to learn that we do not know what we think we 
know. Still, any humiliation a student suffers as the result of such 
teaching should not be the result of the use of the power of the teacher's 
position to cause pain to a student by means of ridicule, as though the 
teacher were pointing out something special about that student or as 
though he or she were different from the rest of us. Rather, the point of 
the Socratic method is its offer of an opportunity for the student to catch 
himself or herself in the act of saying what he or she does not (and 
cannot, here and now) mean. This dissonance between what we say and 
what we mean (or mean to imply) happens frequently with all human 
beings. The point of Socratic questioning is simply to show not where 
we all differ but rather where we all are the same: we all share the 
condition of, on occasion, not knowing what we claim to know. 
Thus, the humiliation suffered in Socratic questioning, rather than 
serving to differentiate students or discriminate among them in regard 
to their knowledge (or lack of it), tends to emphasize what they (and we) 
share. We who teach Socratically are saying that there is something we 
all share, call it "human ignorance" or "human vanity," or a combination 
of the two. The point is: this is a permanent part of our human 
condition, not something that we can remove once and for all. Conse-
quently, we all had' better recognize it about ourselves and others and 
learn how to deal with it. The way that Socrates developed for dealing 
with it is his Socratic method of questioning and answering. 
The negative side of law teaching is the side that says to the student: 
you are wrong about something. And this lesson comes to mean that 
they are wrong about themselves, the world, and their professional 
competence-merely everything that matters most to them at this 
particular juncture of their lives. Our teaching cannot and should not 
end with this lesson, however, for it is a half-truth, only half of the 
lesson that Socratic teaching, truly understood, teaches. I said before 
that Socrates taught this same negative lesson in the form, "You don't 
know what you think you know." But there also is a second lesson 
taught by the Socratic method, taught simultaneously with the negative 
lesson, and the positive lesson is: "You know more (or other) than what 
you think (you know)." How does this second lesson get taught by 
means of Socratic questioning? 
When I stop a student who is trying to recite or respond to one of my 
questions, what do I encourage that student to do? In the face of my 
rejection and criticism, what do I expect or ask of the student? It may 
sound strange, or even perverse, but what I ask from my students in 
such a situation is this: I ask them to try again. That is all that I ask; 
but it is enough. 
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I ask them to look at the case again and to see what it says (or 
implies), to look at themselves and see what they are doing, or to listen 
to themselves and hear what they are saying. I ask them to hold 
themselves in front of the class and in front of their materials and 
examine what they are doing with these colleagues and with these 
materials. What they are saying may be wrong, unjust, inapt, 
outrageous, or untrue; there is no single dimension of impropriety to 
which the assessment of a person's answers can be limited. What is 
most important is that the mistake or miscue not be allowed to pass 
unnoticed; its wrongness or impropriety must be acknowledged. Thus, 
I am asking the student for a recognition that he or she has done 
something wrong. 
In retum for this acknowledgment, I shall reciprocate. If the student 
will acknowledge his or her mistake, the wrongness or impropriety of 
what they were just saying or claiming, then I shall listen to them 
seriously aIld respond. That is the reciprocal commitment I make. If 
they will try again, then so shall I. Upon their trying again, we may all 
learn that the mistake was not the student's but mine; that what they 
were trying to say was right, but that I mistook what they were trying 
to say (or mistook its truth or propriety) or misunderstood the materials 
that we are discussing at the moment. In a teaching method based upon 
disillusionment and humility, it is not the students alone who are 
threatened with being humiliated or refuted in front of everyone. This 
is a risk that any teacher must bear who wishes to engage in the 
Socratic contract with students; the weight of learning and the promise 
of revelation- require it. 
How do I reciprocate, specifically? What does my willingness to 
reciprocate mean and how does it operate? There are three aspects of 
positive learning and student encouragement that seem to come to the 
fore in the _process of my reciprocation (my agreeing with my students 
to stop, look, and listen again). First, in asking them to return to the 
case or the material and to think again, I am implicitly placing faith in 
them to do correctly what they failed to do in the first place. How can 
I do this in the face of their failure? Because no matter how many times 
my students fail to respond correctly, I trust that eventually the vast 
majority of them will develop the ability and skill to read and under-
stand legal.materials. This means that I trust-them eventually to learn 
how to do so. In fact, rightly understood, they already have much of 
what they need in order to know how to read and understand the law or 
how to gaiJ,1 or derive or create answers from the law (as I put it in 
section II). They do because they have much of the social and intellectu-
al competencies that we expect of young adults, and these competencies 
are the bases of our powers. Thus, it is right to say, as James Boyd 
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White does, that in law teaching, "[t]he declarative proposition cannot 
be the center of this sort of discourse, as it is of conceptual talk, for we 
know that our words and our thoughts cannot be reduced to the sort of 
unitary meaning,' nor the world be reduced to the sort of fixed and 
knowable categories, required by that kind of thought."33 As White 
explains, our teaching (which is Socratic) "will assume, what is true of 
all of our readers [and students], that he or she has a full competence at 
the social and linguistic practices by which our world is defined. It is 
thus on our knowledge of language as practice and art or on our shared 
social and linguistic competence, that we will most rely [in our teaching]; 
this is not infirmity, but strength, for this is the knowledge we most 
securely have."34 Wittgenstein's emphasis that our knowledge of 
language, 'our possession of our words, is measured by whether or not 
(and to what extent) we know "how to go on" with our words,35 also 
exemplifies the fact that we rely on the social and intellectual competen-
cies that we all learn and possess and share by learning our native 
languages. 
The positive Socratic message-''You know more (or other) than what 
you think (you know)"-is based upon just such confidence in our shared 
abilities to make ourselves and our world understood, to make them 
known, by means of our shared media (most especially, or most fully, 
through our language). Otherwise, why do you suppose Socrates would 
spend his time speaking with others, both old and young, among those 
Athenians who deign to speak with him? I think Socrates realized that 
gold is where you find it, and the moral is that you may find it anywhere 
(or nowhere, of course) and that all you can do in such teaching is to 
take pains and the trouble to look. 
It may be true that a part of what a student learns by way of teaching 
by disillusionment is that he or she is mistaken about something when 
they claimed to know. Nonetheless, they also learn, with the help of a 
teacher's encouragement, a teacher's willingness to try them again and 
to listen again, that they have the tools necessary to get the matter 
right, or at least that their teacher trusts that, with some more 
perseverance and work, they can develop the means by which to get this 
matter right. Why else do we work so hard in law school, class after 
class, day after day, on the materials, going through them slowly and 
steadily, always looking to the students to help us understand the 
33. JAMES BoYD WHITE, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem, in HERACLES' Bow 107, 
127 (1985). 
34. [d. 
35. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 143-151, 179,323 
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1968). 
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materials? The change in the students, their accretion of "know how," 
may be im~rceptible, but by the end of a month, or surely by the end 
I 
of the semester, it is there and it is undeniable. Most of the students 
have learnea, have developed, the means and the methods by which to 
become lawYers. They have learned to do the things that lawyers do. 
As to the $tudent's second lesson, that the world has fooled him or her, 
they also learn that the world is readable: at least on some occasions in 
some conte~ts, it does give us an answer. We cannot hope for more, but 
we should npt expect less. This is one reason why skepticism is not the 
right infere~ce to draw from the students' experience of being refuted. 
Simply becS;use the world fooled them once, or they got it wrong, does 
not mean that they can never get it right. What needs to be done, as 
soon and as often as possible, is to get each student back on track by 
asking him or her to recite again, or to recognize them the next time 
they volunteer, with the hope that this time they will be able to display 
to you and the class what they have learned. 
As to the Ithird lesson, that they have been rejected by their teacher 
and implici~ly by their profession, the positive side is that the teacher 
befriends th;em again, soliciting or welcoming their renewed effort, and 
the teacher, keeps himself or herself open to the possibility that the 
teacher-an;d not the student-is wrong in this instance. The reciprocity 
implicit in r¢cognizing that mistakes work both ways, or that both of you 
are capable :of making mistakes (and then, too, the reciprocal bearing of 
the pain arid theet'fort of correcting them), goes a long way toward 
teaching th~ right message. 
When I stop a student's recitation of a case, I am doing two things at 
once. First, I am stopping the student's narrative, and that frustrates 
him or her.~6 The student wants to get on with the narrative, because 
he or she thinks they know what the case is about or why it was decided 
the way it was (otherwise they would not have volunteered to state the 
case), and they want to tell me about it. However, I will not let them. 
I am not prepared to hear their story yet. Instead, I want them-and I 
am forcing them-to go back over the story, to think about it again, and 
to tell me (and themselves) once more what the case is about. Second, 
I also am hidicating to them that I think they are mistaken in some-
thing they have said or failed to say; either they have misrepresented 
some fact or proceeding below, or they have neglected something in the 
opinion tha* I want them to note. So I am telling them that I think that 
they are wrong about something, even as I also frustrate them, by 
preventing them from expressing what they want to say. These are two 
36. This frUstration is expressed in the complaints I receive in the student evaluations 
of my teaching, about the fact that I "interrupt" them so often. See supra note 11. 
HeinOnline -- 45 Mercer L. Rev. 618 1993-1994
618 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
things that I am signalling to them, and also two things that I am doing 
to them. 
, Then, in order to bring them back to these materials, to help them try 
again, after dashing their expectations and hopes in such a hurtful 
fashion, I must reciprocate. If they will try again, I shall try again. If 
they will listen, I shall listen; if they will look and see, then I too will 
look again and see again. Everything remains open, remains to be done. 
This means that, like Socrates, I 'must continue to befriend my 
students;37 I must continue to solicit their opinions and views, to 
welcome them, and to give them a fair hearing in the forum of the 
classroom (and outside as well, if they address their questions to me 
outside the classroom). This must be done not only because it is entailed 
by the ethics of the situation, but alE'o because we have no other way in 
which to teach them what we need to teach them and what they need to 
learn. Without this, there can be no transmission of law from one 
generation to the next; indeed, there can be no law. Stanley Cavell 
shows us this: ' 
If my teacher of French will not' accept what I say and do as what he 
says and does, perhaps treating my American accent with tacit 
contempt, then I will not learn French (from him). But what happens 
if "my elders", all of them (those bigger people from whom ... I learn 
to use words), will not accept what I say and do as what they say and 
do? Must they? Is it only natural for them to? Is it their responsibili-
ty? 
I would like to say: If I am to have a native tongue, I have to accept 
what "my elders" say and do as consequential; and they have to accept, 
even have to applaud, what I say and do as what they say and do.38 
If we are to have laws among us, shareable by us and teachable to us 
and learnable by us, and if our students are to learn the language of the 
law (which entails learning the form of life that we call "law"), then at 
some point our students must take what we law teachers say and do as 
consequential. But then, too, so must we law teachers take what our 
students say and do as consequential, as what we say and do. Similarly, 
each citizen, each member of the polity, must take what other citizens, 
other members of the polity, say and do, as consequential, as what he or 
she says and does, if there is to be a citizenry, a polity, a state at all. 
37. I have said something about this aspect of Socrates' teaching in my earlier two 
articles: See Must Virtue Be Taught?, supra note 2, at 497-98; and "Neuer Mind the 
Manner of My Speech," supra note 16, at 267-68. 
38. STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON, supra note 19, at 28. 
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A class driven by questions, questions asked of the students and 
questions djrected back to the teacher, is based upon the assumption 
that everyone present has read and studied these materials, and is 
prepared to venture some sort of opinion or response if and when asked 
to do so. While we may not all have the same experience with these 
materials ot may not all begin with the same skills, the proje,ct is one of 
inducing all of us to enlarge and enhance our skills of law-making and 
law-construal by doing the actual artistry required of a legal profession-
a1.39 We may start from different positions and various approaches vis-
a-vis these materials, but our teaching and training are meant to make 
us more cox,nmensurate in regard to how we think about and handle 
legal material. They are not meant to make us "the same" in how we 
think about and handle the law but to make us more commensurate, 
more capable of speaking and thinking and working together, more 
capable of communicating, than we otherwise would be, or than we 
otherwise were at the beginning of the class. 
V. THE PROMISE AND THE POVERTY OF SOCRATIC QUESTIONING 
I say that this is teaching by disillusionment, and I hope that by this 
point I have made some sense out of my claim. But, at the same time, 
and perhaps in an odd way, I see this teaching as leading to a kind of 
renewal, a renewed engagement with the law, and with critical thinking 
(which here means, Socratic questioning). 
If I am right in what I said above, following Socrates and Emerson 
and Wittgenstein, concerning the necessity of illusion in human life and 
experience, then teaching Socratically holds an impoverished kind of 
promise. The promise is that it claims to possess "a true knowledge of 
what our illusions are," and it locates them in the very structure, the 
necessities, of human life and language. The poverty of the Socratic 
method, however, is that all it promises us is that there is work to be 
done; that we need to persevere in trying to learn and understand 
ourselves, others, and the world around us; and that all of these tasks 
begin by knowing ourselves. For Socrates (as for Emerson, and 
Wittgenstein), the work is never finished. Still, it has a beginning, or a 
start, and that is in self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is the root, the 
home, of knowledge.40 
39. Showing this side of legal education and practice has been a constant theme of 
James Boyd White's work. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra 
note 31. See al~o Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer, supra note 12. 
40. I would claim, if I knew how to make it intelligible, that this insight is expressed 
with a Wittgensteinian twist, given his own kind of translation, in the following maxim: 
"Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement." LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON 
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If we begin with self-knowledge, do we (need we) always end with 
disillusionment? I would not claim that self-knowledge always or 
everywhere leads to disillusionmeJ;lt. But I might be willing to say that 
the normal curve of this life moves from enchantment to disillusionment. 
Knowing what all of us know (or think we know) of infancy and 
childhood, and adding to it what we teachers know of the process of 
education, this seems so to me. Perhaps I might put my point less 
pejoratively by saying that our lives lead from innocence to experience. 
(This is a constant theme of the Romantics, but then this observation 
merely tells us that human life and experience are in part truthfully 
depicted by them, however much the cynics and skeptics wish to deny 
it.) Then what does our experience come to? Perhaps this states the 
question to which Socratic teaching is one answer. 
There are times when we not only can turn from the world (or it turns 
from us), but even perhaps when we must turn from it, in disenchant-
ment and disillusionment. "The world is too much with us," someone 
famous once said,41 and I take this to state the literal truth on many 
occasions. However, just as surely as day follows night, there are also 
times when we must pick up the pieces, pick up our tools, and turn 
agaiJ;l to the world, to begin again (if not anew, then at least afresh). 
"[I]n a world so perplexingly contrived as this is," as G. M. Young said 
in honoring Maitland, "a frank and joyous acknowledgement ofignorance 
is the only way of wisdom."42 I have said that Socratic teaching begins 
in questioning that leads to disillusionment. If this disillusionment is 
not exactly a "joyous" acknowledgment of our initial ignorance, then 
perhaps this fact reveals that there remains something else left to be 
done after we remove our illusions. 
CERTAINTY §378 (D. Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1969). 
41. It was Wordsworth. $ee WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, [Sonnet] XIV, in THE PRELUDE: 
SELECTED POEMS AND SONNETS 186 (Carlos Baker ed. 1954): 
The world is too much with us; late and soon, 
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers: 
Little we see in Nature that is ours; 
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon! 
For this, for everything, we are out of tune; 
It moves us not. 
42. G. M. YOUNG, Maitland, in VICTORIAN ESSAYS 173, 175 (W. Handcock ed. 1962). 
